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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 10-1875/2400 
_____________ 
 
JUNIOR NATHANIEL RICKETTS 
 a/k/a Junior Mohammed Ricketts 
 a/k/a Paul Milton Miles,  
                             Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 
                                       Respondent 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A027-024-434) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
February 6, 2020 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and FISHER, 
Circuit Judges  
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(Filed: April 8, 2020) 
_______________ 
 
Noah M. Weiss    [ARGUED] 
Williams & Connolly 
725 12th Street, NW 
Washington, DC   20005 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
 
John M. McAdams, Jr. 
Benjamin M. Moss   [ARGUED] 
Erik R. Quick 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation  
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   20044 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Junior Ricketts petitions for review of two decisions by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), denials of a 
motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider.  He has told 
various adjudicatory bodies for nearly 30 years that he is an 
American citizen.  Last year, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court finding 
that he is not.  Since his citizenship claim is the only basis on 
which he says he is entitled to relief from the order of removal, 
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and since he cannot now rely on that claim, we will deny the 
petition for review.  
 
I. Background 
 
Ricketts, whom the government has always maintained 
is a citizen of Jamaica, has been convicted of several felonies; 
hence his immigration difficulties.  On December 17, 1992, he 
was charged, among other crimes, with embezzlement and 
transporting a minor in interstate or foreign commerce with the 
intent to engage in sexual activity.  He pled guilty to all charges 
and, as an additional consequence of his criminal convictions, 
was deemed subject to removal. 
 
In proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), 
however, Ricketts argued that he was actually a U.S. citizen.   
The IJ rejected that claim, and the BIA dismissed his appeal.  
He petitioned our court for review and, at the same time, sought 
a stay of removal.  While the petition and the motion for a stay 
were pending, Ricketts was removed to Jamaica, and his 
petition and motion were “procedurally terminated without 
judicial action.”  Clerk Order, Ricketts v. Attorney General, 
No. 00-3270 (3d Cir. Jul. 31, 2000). 
 
Continuing to insist that he is an American, Ricketts 
persuaded the Jamaican Constabulary Force to investigate his 
citizenship status.  Officials there agreed with him and, 
accordingly, he was sent back to the United States in February 
2003, approximately three years after he was removed. 
 
In 2005, while Ricketts was in state custody for a 
criminal theft conviction, the Department of Homeland 
Security learned of his return and reinstated his order of 
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removal.  Four years later, he received a copy of the Jamaican 
report stating that he is an American citizen and not a Jamaican 
citizen.  With that evidence in hand, he filed with the BIA 
motions to reopen his removal proceedings and to reconsider 
the existing order of removal – the motions at issue now.1  The 
BIA dismissed both motions, asserting that, because of a 
regulatory provision known as the post-departure bar, 8 C.F.R. 
 
1 In 2006, Ricketts had filed a petition for review of the 
reinstated order of removal with this Court.  We dismissed the 
case because “our duty to dismiss untimely claims is 
mandatory where the Attorney General objects on the basis of 
untimeliness.”  Order, Ricketts v. Attorney General, No. 06-
4612 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2007).  That year Ricketts also filed two 
motions to reopen with the BIA, asking the BIA to exercise its 
sua sponte authority to reconsider his initial order of removal.  
The BIA denied both of those motions as untimely.  Ricketts 
asked the BIA to reissue its denial of those motions, which it 
declined to do.  Those earlier motions are not before us. 
 
5 
 
§ 1003.2(d), it lacked jurisdiction.2  Ricketts again petitioned 
for review.3   
 
At the parties’ request, we stayed this case several 
times.4  Then, at their joint request, we transferred the case to 
 
2 The “post-departure bar” is found in 8 C.F.R. 
1003.2(d), and states as follows: 
 
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider 
shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who 
is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings subsequent to his or her 
departure from the United States. Any departure 
from the United States, including the deportation 
or removal of a person who is the subject of 
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, 
occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or 
a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a 
withdrawal of such motion.  
 
3 To be precise, Ricketts filed two petitions for review, 
one for his motion to reopen and one for his motion to 
reconsider.  We consolidated the two cases and, for ease of 
reference, speak of the petitions in the singular.   
 
4 From June 2011 to May 2014, this case was stayed 
pending Ricketts’s criminal proceedings in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of New York under 18 
U.S.C. § 911 for “falsely and willfully represent[ing] himself 
to be a citizen of the United States[,]” among other crimes.  
(Joint Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance dated Jun. 10, 
2011, Ricketts v. Attorney Gen., No. 10-1875.)  That case was 
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York (“EDNY”), the district where Ricketts resides, to resolve 
disputed facts concerning his claim of American citizenship, 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B).  (Joint Motion dated 
1/13/2015, Ricketts v. Attorney Gen., No. 10-1875.)  We held 
the petition for review in abeyance pending the resolution of 
the citizenship question, including any appeal of that decision.   
 
The whole basis of Ricketts’s citizenship claim is his 
assertion that he was born in Brooklyn on August 31, 1964 as 
Paul Milton Miles.  He says he changed his name for religious 
reasons.  To substantiate his claim that he is Paul Milton Miles, 
he submitted various official records, including a birth 
certificate in that name, with the name crossed out and “Junior 
Mohammed Ricketts” written above it.  The EDNY found that 
Ricketts’s evidence was not credible and that the government’s 
evidence proving Ricketts is not a U.S. citizen was persuasive.5  
 
resolved when he pled guilty to witness tampering.  The other 
charges were dismissed.     
 
5 That is putting it mildly.  Among other things, the 
Court concluded that “only one person named Paul Milton 
Miles was born in Brooklyn New York” from 1955 to 1970, 
and that person is the son of Lizzie Mae Page Miles and Robert 
Miles, Jr.  Ricketts v. Lynch, No. 15-cv-00329, 2016 WL 
3676419, at*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2016).  At deposition, Lizzie 
Mae Page Miles identified her son, Paul Milton Miles, who 
“was physically present in the room” and who is not Junior 
Ricketts.  Id. at *3.  For a more complete recitation of the 
evidence Ricketts and the government presented regarding 
Ricketts’s citizenship claims, see id. at *2-*5. 
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Ricketts v. Lynch, No. 15-cv-00329, 2016 WL 3676419 
(E.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2016). The Second Circuit affirmed that 
decision, and subsequently denied Ricketts’s motion to 
reconsider the affirmance.  Ricketts v. Barr, No. 18-2244, 2019 
WL 938996 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2019); Ricketts v. Barr, No. 18-
2244, 2019 WL 1858373 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2019). 
 
Next, we lifted the stay in this case and ordered 
supplemental briefing to “address[ ] the validity of the 
departure bar regulation and the impact, if any, of the Second 
Circuit’s decision” on these proceedings.  (Order dated 
8/28/19, Ricketts v. Attorney Gen., 10-1875.)  In supplemental 
briefing, Ricketts argued that we must remand to the BIA 
because it improperly contracted its jurisdiction when, in 
applying the post-departure bar, it dismissed his appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction.  The government argued in response that 
remand would be futile, since the BIA cannot grant Ricketts 
relief from removal on the ground that he is a citizen, as that 
claim has been foreclosed by the rulings of the EDNY and 
Second Circuit.  We agree with the government that remand 
would be futile, so we will focus solely on that and not address 
whether the BIA erred in stating that the post-departure bar 
deprived it of jurisdiction.   
 
II. Discussion 
 
Even if the BIA erred when it characterized the post-
departure bar as a restriction of its jurisdiction,6 we may forgo 
 
6 At oral argument, the government emphasized that the 
BIA decisions at issue here are some ten years old, and it 
intimated that the BIA has ended the practice of dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction under the post-departure bar, perhaps under 
8 
 
remanding this case if a remand would be futile.  Under S.E.C. 
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), a court will generally 
dispose of an administrative law case only on the grounds cited 
by the pertinent agency, but remand for further agency action 
is unnecessary when “only one disposition is possible as a 
matter of law.”  George Hyman Const. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 
1532, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  As the Supreme Court has noted, 
Chenery “does not require that we convert judicial review of 
agency action into a ping-pong game.”  NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969).  When only one 
outcome is possible, “[i]t would be meaningless to remand.”  
Id.  Such circumstances are sometimes described as 
constituting the “remand futility” exception to the general rule 
laid down in Chenery.   
 
Ricketts tries to resist application of the remand futility 
exception by arguing first, that we have not previously held 
that the exception applies in immigration proceedings, and 
second, that remand futility is rare and the exception should not 
be applied when jurisdiction is in question.   
 
 
the weight of circuit court decisions saying it could not 
properly do so.  See Santana v. Holder, 731 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 
2013) (holding that the “post-departure bar cannot be used to 
abrogate a noncitizen’s statutory right to file a motion to 
reopen,” id. at 61, and collecting cases from six courts of 
appeals holding the same and three courts of appeals striking 
“down the regulation as an impermissible contraction of the 
agency’s jurisdiction[.]”  Id. at 54-55.).  Since it is a most 
serious question whether the BIA may restrict its jurisdiction, 
as it did here, we hope that is the case. 
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It is true that we have not expressly held that the remand 
futility exception applies in the immigration context, but we 
have suggested as much.  For example, in Nbaye v. Attorney 
General, 665 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2011), the government argued 
that remand would be futile because the alien could not avoid 
removal.  We rejected that argument because there was in that 
case at least one scenario in which “remand surely would not 
have been futile[,]” but we did not dispute that the remand 
futility exception could have application in the right 
circumstances.  Id. at 59-60.  The government also cites 
immigration cases from outside our Circuit in which courts 
have explicitly recognized the remand futility exception.  See 
Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 235 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(holding in the alternative that remand would be futile because 
the alien could not prevail under the legal standard); Shou Wei 
Jin v. Holder, 572 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Although 
the IJ’s legal error gives us pause-and a different record may 
well have justified a remand-a remand would be futile in this 
case because [the noncitizen] presented no evidence [to 
support his claims].”).   
 
This case gives us an opportunity to say what others 
have said and we have only suggested before: namely, that 
when remand would be futile – meaning the BIA on remand 
would be unable as a matter of law to grant the relief sought – 
we may deny a petition for review, without regard to the 
various issues that might otherwise be in play in the case.  That 
indeed is our holding today.   
 
The only argument Ricketts raised in his motions to 
reopen and to reconsider is that he was a United States citizen 
and therefore not removable.  The Second Circuit, based on the 
thoughtful work done by the EDNY, has conclusively 
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determined that Ricketts is not a United States citizen.  The 
BIA is bound by that decision as a matter of law. See Baez-
Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Once 
[a United States Court of Appeals] reach[es] a conclusion, both 
the Constitution and the statute require[ ] the [BIA] to 
implement it.”).  Even if it were not, both issue preclusion and 
claim preclusion would apply here, with the same result.  See 
Duvall v. Attorney Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“Collateral estoppel [, or issue preclusion,] generally applies 
when the same issue was previously litigated by the same 
parties and was actually decided by a tribunal of competent 
jurisdiction.”); Duhaney v. Attorney Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, 
bars a party from initiating a second suit against the same 
adversary based on the same ‘cause of action’ as the first 
suit.”).  Since the BIA cannot grant Ricketts relief from 
removal on the basis that he is a citizen, remand would be 
futile.   
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Ricketts’s 
petition for review.   
